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majority appears to have read this elastic element into the Act. This
was done almost as if for the particular circumstance, because the
Columbia Steel case was not overruled as consistency would dictate.
Rather it was cited and quoted approvingly by the Court.
The precedental value of the First National Bank case is for
situations involving assets acquisitions, not accompanied by merger,
by corporations not subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC. These
acquisitions were not brought within the realm of the Clayton Act
by the Philadelphia National Bank case. The Government must rely
on the Sherman Act. It is almost a certainty that both prosecutor
and prosecuted will argue that the First National Bank case compels
a decision in their favor, that the Justice Department will rely on the
rule of per se illegality, and that the defendants will rely on the
Columbia Steel factors test.
William H. Fortune
Em-Ercr DoMAw-QUALiF=G TiE NON-EXPERT WrrN~ss.-In a con-
demnation action, the property owner was permitted to testify as to
the fair market value of the property in question. The Commonwealth
moved to strike the testimony as incompetent. The motion was denied
and the jury found for the property owner in the amount of 44,000
dollars. Held: Reversed and remanded. The testimony given by the
property owner revealed no familiarity with property values in the
neighborhood and was clearly incompetent. The court went on to
say prospectively that the property owner will not be presumed com-
petent simply because he is the owner of the property in question;
that the owner must be qualified as competent before he gives an
estimate of value. Commonwealth v. Fister, 378 S.W.2d 720 (Ky.
1963).
The court in the Fister case was careful to say that it was making
only a procedural change; that under prior Kentucky law1 the property
owner was presumed competent to testify as to market value, but if it
were shown on cross examination that he was not, the testimony was
subject to motion to strike. This case has the immediate effect of
certifying the law. The prior law seemingly was in conflict as to the
status of the property owner as a witness on market value.2 Decisions
in which it was held error not to strike the owner's testimony may
1 Hipp-Green Lumber Corp. v. Potter, 271 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1954).
2 See generally 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 545(8): "Although there is some
authority to the contrary it is generally held that the owner of realty is competent
to testify as to its value; and his estimate is received although his knowledge on
the subject is not such as would qualify him to testify if he were not the owner."
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RECENT CASES
have turned on whether the property in question was of a technical
nature so that evaluation was difficult 3 or whether the witness was
merely an officer of the corporate owner of the property.4 On the other
hand, it is not at all clear that the owner was ever presumed to be a
competent witness on account of ownership.5 Whether the Fister case
changed the law at all and whether the change, if any, was substantive
or procedural are moot questions. It is now clear that the owner
stands in no better position than any other witness and must be
qualified before he gives an opinion as to market value.
The secondary effect of the Fister case is to raise the question of
what qualification is necessary. The attorney must consider the
distinct possibility that his witness may not be allowed to give an
opinion as to the value of the property in question.
Generally, appellate courts have considered that the matter of
qualification is within the discretion of the trial court6 and trial courts
have traditionally been lenient in accepting testimony. Trial courts
generally consider a non-expert witness competent if he has superior
knowledge of the property in question and it appears that he can
contribute something to the jury's evaluation.7
In the past, Kentucky courts likewise have been lenient in allowing
non-experts to testify.8 As recently as 1963, the court of appeals has
Saulsberry v. Ky. & W. Va. Power Co., 226 Ky. 75, 10 S.W.2d 451 (1928).
remarked that in very few instances is there any issue of qualification,9
and the attitude of the courts undoubtedly has been that the inexperi-
ence and ineptness of the witness goes to the weight of his testimony,
not to his competency. 10
But the court of appeals in the very recent case of Commonwealth
v. Slusher" set out the general prospective rule that a non-expert
witness must: (1) know the property to be valued, and (2) the value
of the property in the vicinity, (3) must understand the standard of
value, and (4) must be possessed of the ability to make a reasonable
inference.' It is apparent that a trial court may on the basis of that
3 Hipp-Green Lumber Corp. v. Potter, supra note 1.
4 Allen Co. v. Thoroughbred Motor Court, Inc., 272 S.W.2d 348 (Ky. 1954).
5 "There must be some basis for a knowledge of market value before a witness
may express an opinion as to value." (Emphasis added.) Allen Co. v. Thorough-
bred Motor Court, Inc., supra note 3, at 344. But cf. Barron v. Phelps, 238
S.W.2d 1016 (Ky. 1951).
6 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 132 (2d ed. 1953).
75 Nichols, Eminent Domain 206 (3d ed. 1962).8 Paintsville Nat. Bank v. Conley, 257 Ky. 425, 78 S.W.2d 313 (1935);
9 Commonwealth v. Tyree, 365 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Ky. 1963).
'0 Commonwealth v. Tyree, supra note 9, at 478; Cf. Commonwealth v.
Begley, 272 Ky. 289, 292, 114 S.W.2d 127, 129 (1938).
11371 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1963).
12 Commonwealth v. Slusher, supra note 11, at 853, quoting 32 C.J.S.
Evidence § 545.
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decision be quite exacting in determining the qualifications of the
non-expert. First, the witness is supposed to have some knowledge of
property values in the vicinity and, while a knowledge of comparable
sales is not necessary,'8 it is incumbent on the witness to convince the
court that he "knows" property. How this is to be done without the
use of comparable sales is not clear. Secondly, the witness must
understand the standard of value. While no court would require a
witness to recite the traditional definition of market value,' 4 a court
might well require that the witness evince some conceptual under-
standing of the real estate market and that values are not what people
are asking15 or what the witness would pay for it.'8 Thirdly, the
witness is required to be able to make a reasonable inference. What-
ever that term may encompass, a trial judge could surely disqualify a
witness if it appeared that the witness lacked the basic intelligence to
relate his abstract knowledge of market value and the market to
the property in question.
In the Fister case, the court of appeals held that the property
owner's testimony should have been stricken because the owner did
not disclose any familiarity with property values in the neighborhood,
because his estimates were based on irrelevant factors which did not
legally affect market value, and because his valuations showed an
unexplained discrepancy.' 7 The court looked back at the witness'
testimony and decided that the record showed that the witness was
incompetent. Admittedly, the court declared that other non-expert
opinions, while not of a high caliber, were competent.'8 Nevertheless,
the portent of this case is that thorough cross examination, using the
requisite qualifications as set out in the Slusher case, may prevent
much opinion evidence from ever being heard by the jury. If the
trial court refuses to allow adequate preliminary examination or
refuses to disqualify for shown cause, there is a basis for reversing
in the court of appeals. The attorney who would use the non-expert
to establish his damages must prepare the witness for an examination
as to his knowledge of the property in question, his knowledge of
neighboring property values, his concept of fair market value, and his
ability to make a reasonable inference.
William H. Fortune
13 Commonwealth v. Smith, 229 Ky. 345, 17 S.W.2d 203 (1929).
'4 "The market value is the price which it will bring when it is offered for
sale by one who desires to sell but is not compelled to do so, and is bought by
one who desires to purchase but is not compelled to have it." Commonwealth
v. Combs, 244 Ky. 204, 211, 50 S.W.2d 497, 500 (1932).
15 Commonwealth v. Begley, supra note 10, at 292, 114 S.W.2d at 129.
16 Brown v. Town of Eustis, 293 Fed. 197, 198 (S.D. Fla. 1923).
17 Commonwealth v. Fister, 378 S.W.2d 720, 721 (Ky. 1963).
18 Ibid.
[Vol. 52,
